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ABSTRACT – This paper is a first step toward closing the analytical gap in the extensive 
literature on the results of interactions between public and private R&D expenditures, and their 
joint effects on the economy. Econometric studies in this area report a plethora of sometimes 
confusing and frequently contradictory estimates of the response of company financed R&D to 
changes in the level and nature of public R&D expenditure, but the necessary theoretical 
framework within which the empirical results can be interpreted is seldom provided. A major 
cause of “inconsistencies” in the empirical literature is the failure to recognize key differences 
among the various policy “experiments” being considered – depending upon the economy in 
which they are embedded, and the type of public sector R&D spending that is contemplated. 
Using a simple, stylized structural model, we identify the main channels of impact of public 
R&D. We thus can characterize the various effects, distinguishing between short-run and long-
run impacts that would show up in simple regression analyses of nominal public and private 
R&D expenditure variables. Within the context of our simple model it is possible to offer 
interpretations that shed light on recent cross-section and panel data findings at both high (i.e. 
national) and low (specific technology area) levels of aggregation. 
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 I. BLACK BOXES TYPICALLY HOLD MORE HEAT THAN LIGHT 
   
The interior of the black box of technology by now has become increasing 
crowded with economists of various stripes, and although growing areas are illuminated by 
the accumulating results of their investigations, some large regions of darkness remain.
1 
One of the darkest patches of terrain is the realm where public and private R&D interact. 
It is not that this “heart of darkness” has remained infrequently visited. Quite the contrary: 
a survey of the econometric literature (which we undertook in collaboration with Andrew 
Toole) has identified more than 50 papers, most of them quite recent, that seek to address 
in one way or another the issue of the nature of those interactions.
2 The fact that the 
question keeps being raised, however, is in this case symptomatic not only of the interest 
that attaches to it but of the elusiveness of a satisfyingly conclusive answer. 
 
Quite obviously it is a matter of considerable importance for science and 
technology policy-makers to know whether government R&D expenditures and company-
financed R&D investments behave like substitutes or like complements. Insofar as the 
rationale for government support of R&D rests on the presupposition that too little 
research would be performed were the private sector to be left to its own devices, intense 
concern surrounds the possibility that public allocations for that purpose are being 
substituted for investments that firms would otherwise undertake. There is, in short, a 
worry that private R&D may be “crowded out” and the use of taxpayers money rendered 




But, like other processes that occur inside “black boxes,” economic research on 
this issue has tended to be accompanied by more heat than light. Many of the findings that 
the literature presently offers on the question of substitutes vs. complements seem 
diametrically at odds with one another. In good part that results from the fact that the 
problem is being approach in very different ways, at different levels of aggregation, and 
with econometric models whose specifications and estimation methods are not the same. 
Yet, it is also attributable in some part to the field’s under-investment in sorting out the 
various possible channels of influence that may be involved, and in examining their 
                                                            
1 Edwin Mansfield justly was recognized as one among the handful of economists who pioneered systematic 
explorations, beginning in the 1950’s, of the interior of the “black box” of technology. That evocative phrase 
has been employed by Nathan Rosenberg (1982) in alluding to economists general disinclination to explicitly 
examine technological specifics; and in urging that greater attention be directed to the economic and social 
processes determining relationships between productive inputs and outputs – whether for firms, industries or 
entire economies. Ed Mansfield, however, had not needed such encouragement.  
2 See David, Hall and Toole (1999, forthcoming in Research Policy). There is a vastly more extensive body of 
work in economics which deals with case studies of the impact of government research programs upon 
private R&D investment: among these, Mansfield (1991) and Leyden and Link (1992) exemplify the 
applications of methods of non-econometric quantitative assessments;  whereas an historical case study 
approach has been adopted in National Research Council-CSTB (1999).  
3 The question should of course be viewed in the larger context of the political economy literature dealing 
with the critique of state intervention in the economy. For a theoretical treatment of the determinants of 
private funding of public goods, see, e.g., Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). Diamond (1998) approaches 
the issue of “crowding out” of private funding for basic research from this wider perspective, and reviews the 
applied research on the relationship between government income transfers and private charitable donations. 
But only Kealey (1996) has goes so far as to contend that public R&D funding could be substantially replaced 







possible interactions within a more comprehensive equilibrium framework. This cannot be 
done without the aid of some structural models, however simplified they might be. Yet, 
such an approach has remained out of favor among empirical students of this issue. 
 
Because the econometric literature devoted to this topic has proceeded so far 
towards the extreme of “measurement without theory,” we believe that what is likely to 
prove most fruitful at this juncture is the provision of more structural guidance in making 
sense of the empirical findings. Indeed, this seems a necessary next step if we hope to 
sustain the productive momentum that was originally imparted to research in this area by 
Mansfield’s pioneering contributions. Although we are primarily concerned here to 
articulate analytical issues, in what follows we have approached the development of an 
instructive theoretical apparatus by keeping in mind the virtues of  striving for simplicity, 
robustness and transparency ? aiming ultimately to contribute to the practical formation of 
better economic policy.  
 
 
II. WHY WORRY? IS R&D “CROWDING OUT” NECESSARILY BAD? 
 
  Before going to greater analytical lengths, and to further refinements of 
econometric specifications in order to establish whether complementarity rather than 
substitution prevails at the margin in the relationship between public and private R&D 
funding, it surely is worth pausing to consider this question: Should we really be so 
concerned if public research funding happened to displace private R&D expenditures? This 
simple, logically antecedent question hitherto does not seem to have been asked, let alone 
answered in the economics literature. 
 
As a rule, inquiries into whether or not there is “crowding out” of private R&D by 
government contracts, or grants, begin from the traditional supposition that the effect of 
information spillovers is causing the private marginal rate of return to be lower than the 
social marginal rate of return. More strictly, they ask whether this is the case at a level of 
private investment that is “too small.” Hence, there is a presumption that any further 
displacement of private R&D by the direct or indirect effects of public research programs 
must be a perversely bad outcome. This presumption accounts for the absence of explicit 
attention to the question of whether “crowding out” in this context is necessarily bad.  
 
  But, rather than simply positing that the problem of imperfect appropriability 
results everywhere in a deficiency of private R&D investment, we should stop to take 
notice of the extensive list of exceptions that qualify the conventional conclusion based on 
theoretical considerations. Racing behaviors, business stealing strategies, and “excess 
correlation” among companies’ R&D programs, all constitute potential pathologies that 
stem from conditions that cause the expected private marginal rate of return to an 
individual firm’s investments to exceed the marginal social rate on the R&D projects in 
question.
4 In such circumstances it is not implausible to suppose that the “excessive 
concentration” of private expenditures could drive down the social marginal rate of return 
on the R&D performed by the private sector. Indeed, it might depress the latter to levels 
                                                            
4 See Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) on “excess correlation,” and National Research Council (1999), esp. pp. 







well below the social marginal rate on lines of research that the private sector was ignoring 
– possibly due to difficulties in appropriating the benefits fully. 
 
The situation just envisioned bears some resemblance to the one famously 
diagnosed by J.K. Galbraith in The Affluent Society (1969), namely, excessive private 
(consumption) expenditures in the midst of public squalor; and so it conveniently might be 
labeled “the problem of the affluent knowledge society.” Although we can put a catchy 
name to it, demonstrating that there is something worth naming is a greater challenge. The 
foregoing market pathologies have been attested to far more fully by discussions in the 
theoretical literature than by the empirical evidence.
5 We cannot presently say whether or 
not there is any substantial degree of correspondence between reality and the contemplated 
situations of (socially) excessive private investment in R&D. What such evidence as might 
be adduced in this connection tends to show is that R&D performance by some of an 
industry’s firms’ does not depress expected marginal rates of return enjoyed by other firms. 
At least, not sufficiently to drive down the realized average private rates of return, thereby 
lowering the social marginal return on their collective investments. This could very 
plausibly be so because competitors’ R&D projects generally are of the sort that actually 
generate compensating beneficial spillovers, either in the form of additional scientific and 
technological knowledge, or information about the responses of buyers to the design 
properties of new products.  
 
  What possible policy implications would follow from the existence of excess 
correlation among private R&D strategies in specific areas? It is difficult to move forward 
towards generic policy prescription here, precisely because ex hypothesis the situation differs 
greatly between one research area and the next; the nature of the putative problem – if it 
does exist – is that some research areas are being over-funded, whereas other are under-
funded. To think of attacking this by direct targeting of public research, aimed at 
“crowding out” just some private R&D expenditures and not others, would presuppose a 
degree of precision in the evaluation of the situation that does not presently exist, and is 
not likely to obtain.
6 One also would need to ascertain that the public sector was able to 
perform R&D in the targeted area with at least the same effectiveness as could be expected 
of a private firm. 
 
Therefore, it may well be that the best instruments to address the problem where it 
does exist are those of an entirely different sort than the direction of public research 
resources. Where the structure of the payoffs is the source of wastefully duplicative private 
                                                            
5  This issue recently has been examined at the aggregate level by Jones and Williams (1997). These authors 
conclude, on the basis of simulation results for an aggregate growth model, that it is quite unlikely for 
tendencies to over-investment to overwhelm those that would give rise to the opposite effect. Exceptions 
occur (in their model) under conditions that are readily intelligible: where  the real rate of interest is very high, 
so that the value of knowledge spillovers enjoyed by future generations is heavily discounted, and where the 
marginal rate of return on additional R&D is very low.  
6 This difficulty does not apply to a “preemptive strike” policy for the public sector, whereby research and 
patenting in a particular area could be undertaken for the purpose of preventing private agents from acquiring 
intellectual property rights to discoveries that might convey large external benefits were they to be freely 
licensed. The U.S. National Institute of Health actually experimented with a “preemptive” research and 
patenting strategy resembling this during the mid-1990’s, in response to the efforts of a private company to 







research strategies and “socially excessive” expenditures directed toward hastening the 
completion research projects by small margins, then restructuring the expected payoffs 
would be the first-best-form of policy response. Failing that, however, altering the way 
investment tax credits are paid, so as to make the value of the latter diminish at the margin, 
would seem to be worth considering as a more promising line of corrective action.  
 
Another area where “winner takes all” payoffs structures may be inducing 
inefficiently large private outlays for R&D may be seen in the ICT industries. Here there is 
reason to expect that major positive externalities would flow from greater progress towards 
network compatibility standardization. Nonetheless, there are ample indications that 
private firms are induced to direct much of their R&D primarily towards the generation of 
alternative basic system designs, and that the key factor in such decisions is the prospects 
of high rates of return from becoming the reigning de facto standards monopoly. This is the 
case particularly where such designs can be used to shift an existing customer base and 
impart bandwagon momentum to the “innovator’s” marketing efforts. The result tends to 
be the co-existence in the market of excessive diversity of rival designs, none of which are 
manifestly technically superior, but which increase the uncertainty of adopters and so 
postpone the realization of the benefits of standardization. But here, as elsewhere, the 
remedy to consider first would appear to be a reduction of the incentives at the margin, 
possibility by weakening the intellectual property protection that the dominant de facto 
standard is now accorded under the prevailing interpretation of copyright and patent laws. 
 
  We may conclude that where crowding out might occur and yet not be deemed 
necessarily bad, such situations do not automatically make targeted public R&D 
expenditures into a good policy instrument. This reaffirms the basis for the policy-interest 
that adheres to answering the question of whether substitution or complementarity effects 




III. A SKETCH-MAP OF THE INTERIOR TERRITORY 
 
We propose here a simple, but nonetheless analytically grounded taxonomic 
overview of the variety of possible impacts that the funding of R&D in the public sector 
may have upon the performance of company-financed R&D. At the outset it should be 
understood that the relationship of proximate concern to us is that between real levels of 
research expenditure in the two sectors. This focus follows from the fact that these are the 
variables that are most widely reported in official statistical sources over time, among 
different national economic entities, and across various areas of applied relevance. 
Moreover, those are the major variables upon which policy decisions in the public and 
private spheres are focused. Accordingly, for both of those reasons, the mass of the 
theoretical and econometric literature dealing with the role of government R&D funding 
has been directed to examining in the first instance how it affects the company-financed 
counterpart.
7    
                                                            
7 A notable exception is the treatment by Leyden and Link (1991, 1992). They have sought to improve upon 
the state of the literature characterized in the following terms (1992: p.55): “Studies of government R&D 








  A more comprehensive account would, of course, consider also influences that ran 
in the other direction – from private R&D funding decisions to government support of 
scientific and technological research. Yet that would necessarily carry the discussion into 
the realms of the political economy of science and technology policy formation, as well as 
the administration of public sector R&D contracts and intra-mural research project 
management. This would raise important and complex issues into which we cannot enter 
on this occasion. Even so, economists engaged in empirical studies of the effects of public 
expenditures for R&D would do well to bear in mind that the programs through which 
these are undertaken do not arise spontaneously. Far from existing in an economic 
vacuum, the specific purposes, organizational design and funding level in such programs 
reflect both political pressures and technical feasibility constraints. These are shaped by the 
past, current and anticipated R&D activities of private business, as well as by the perceived 
needs of government mission agencies. Although for the purposes of analysis we shall 
suppress all that and proceed as though the volume and composition of government R&D 
performed can be taken as being parametrically fixed by an exogenous policy process, that 
is not an empirical stipulation about the world. Instead, it is an abstraction from reality that 
remains to be justified as reasonable, or shown to be seriously misleading by future 
econometric studies. 
 
  Our framework has been structured along three taxonomic dimensions. To begin 
with we recognize two fundamentally different sets of channels through which the effects 
of interest can flow between the public and private sectors. The set first involves the direct 
effects upon the demand and supply of tangible resource inputs that are used in 
performing R&D. The second category of effects are indirect, so to speak, because they 
involve in the first instance the intangible results of the conduct of R&D, namely, the 
generation of new knowledge, and then the influence which the existence of such 
knowledge may have upon the expected costs and benefits of R&D financed by private 
business. 
 
New knowledge may be made available in codified form, where it can be more 
cheaply transmitted and accessed by those who can “read the code;” or it may be 
“embodied” in the acquired expertise of research scientists and engineers. Such knowledge 
also may be embodied in artifacts, such as scientific instruments whose design prototypes 
emerge as by-products of specific research projects.
8 A convenient taxonomic convention 
that we find helpful in structuring the following discussion is to treat all effects that alter 
the efficiency of research inputs, whether human or inanimate, as operating through the 
second, indirect channel of “knowledge spillovers.” The direct impacts, therefore, are to be 
understood as being restricted to those affecting supply and demand in the market for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
firm behavior...The motivations for government’s involvement, however, has received little attention. When 
the issue has been extensively examined, it has typically been from a normative perspective and has not been 
intended to provide positive analysis of governmental motivations and the effect of those motivations on the 
form of R&D contracts.” These remarks could be extended to apply also to the deficiencies of the economics 
literature on government funding of non-mission-oriented, basic research such as typically is conducted in 
academic institutions. Work in the “new economics of science” has been directed to repairing the latter 
defects. See, e.g., David and Dasgupta (1994), Stephan (1996), David, Foray and Steinmuller (1999).  
8 On tacit knowledge and its economic significance, see David, Cowan and Foray (1999), and works cited 







research resources of a constant “quality.” But it should be equally apparent that influences 
flowing through the knowledge-spillover channels also impinge upon the determination of 
prices in the markets for research-inputs.    
 
  A further useful distinction may be drawn between government R&D outlays that, 
on the one hand, aim to procure research results germane to the presently defined missions 
of various public agencies, and, on the other hand, non-mission-oriented exploratory R&D 
of the sort that has come to be labeled (unsatisfactorily) as “basic research.” The former we 
prefer to characterize as contract R&D, irrespective of whether it is performed for the 
agencies in question by private firms, or in government laboratories. Exploratory research, 
even though it might turn out to contribute to future mission capabilities in ways that 
currently are not clearly foreseen, also may be pursued under public sector management. In 
the US institutional context, however, this latter class of publicly supported research, which 
we designate for simplicity as grant R&D, has been carried on largely under “academic” 
auspices – whether in university research labs or on the “campuses” of national institutes. 
9 
 
  The third of our classificatory axes is one that distinguishes between those impacts 
that register more or less contemporaneously with the change in R&D expenditures, and 
those that ensue with some considerable lag. Following conventional short-hand usage, we 
consider the former within the framework of a single period “comparative statics” analysis; 
the label “dynamic effects” is reserved for the others. This allows for the possibility that 
whereas the immediate impacts of increased public sector R&D expenditures might be to 
“crowd out” private R&D investment, the longer run relationship between the two may be 
that of complements and not substitutes.  
 
Introduction of these timing considerations raises the issue of evaluating the path 
integral of such effects; and that in turn, properly poses the question of whether (and with 
what discount rate) the expenditure streams of the two sectors ought to be cumulated and 
compared to determine whether the overall dynamic relationship is that of complements or 
substitutes. While one must take this preliminary notice of the matter, it is not one that can 
be resolved on this occasion. 
 
  The organization of the following sketch is straightforward: we begin with “static 
equilibrium” configurations, and under that heading proceed by considering, first, effects 
that take place via the research-input market, and then via knowledge spill-overs. Under the 
latter, we distinguish the between the impacts of different kinds of government R&D 
programs.    
 
 
                                                            
9 It may be remarked that the distinctions between defense and civilian R&D, and, within the latter category, 
between “basic” and “applied”, although familiar from the U.S. National Science Board statistics, and 
mirrored in the data published by other nations, do not seem particularly useful for our immediate analytical 
purposes. Rather than emphasizing differences in the characteristics of the knowledge sought, either in terms 
of direct utility (commercial or military) or indirect utility ("basicness"), we prefer to direct attention to the 
institutional setting and contractual arrangements. These impinge differentially upon the scope for knowledge 









1. Static Effects  
 
Joint production conditions aside, the generic impacts of increased government R&D 
expenditures on company funded R&D that are likely to be felt most immediately are those 
channeled through the market for research inputs that are in inelastic supply. We can 
distinguish what may be called “first-order crowding out”, from second-order effects: 
 
 1.1  The  static first-order effect is simply the short-run impact on prices of research 
inputs, arising from the competition for these between the public and private sectors. The 
rise in prices is expected to translate into higher costs, since these are specialized inputs and 
the elasticity of substitution, and hence of demand for, say, researchers and engineers with 
particular expertise, will likely be low. The first-order effects are considered to be so short-
run that the impact of the output from the public R&D expenditures is not an issue. 
Consequently, the expected effect of rising R&D performance costs is to reduce the 
expected rate of return on the private sector's investment, leading some projects to be 
curtailed – ceteris paribus. But while the scale of research efforts is reduced by the higher 
relative prices of research inputs, the impact upon the level of company expenditures 
remains ambiguous at this qualitative level of analysis. 
 
 1.2  Second-order static effects include the expected effects upon private sector rates of 
return owing to the knowledge that may be gained from the current R&D carried out in 
the public sector. Here there are potentialities for "crowding out" to occur in the following 
three ways: 
 
(a)  Firms may reallocate their R&D funding away from longer-term projects in the 
expectation that current public sector expenditures will provide results that they 
can eventually exploit for their future applied R&D. 
(b) Firms may shift “applied” R&D away from projects where they anticipate that 
results of increase public research would become available to competitors, and 
so vitiate the commercial returns from product development in those areas.  
(c)  Contract R&D research performed with government funds displaces R&D that 
firms might have to do as part of the fixed costs of production for goods other 
than those demanded by the government. In other words, in a 
full-employment-like situation, government final demand crowds out private 
final demand, and takes out derived private R&D with it – precisely because the 
government is subsidizing the fixed R&D costs of the goods it wants. 
 
  But, it is also possible that complementarity would be observed because the 
anticipated consequences of current public expenditures stimulates concurrent private 
R&D outlays via the following two channels: 
 
(d) Public R&D in a particular area may signal government intention to promote 
the use of a particular technology. Insofar as this may entail either a future 
commitment to demonstration and diffusion activities by public agencies, or 







rate of return on proprietary technological innovations in that field would be 
raised.
10  
(e)  Admittedly, the effect noted in (d) is the "signal" of future demand. But, this is 
likely to be observationally equivalent to the impact of the expectation that 
public R&D will yield some infrastructure knowledge (to use Link's 
terminology) that will reduce private R&D costs, or decrease the variance of 
project costs. Insofar as there is a prospect of future "racing" for proprietary 
inventions in the field, there is an incentive for companies to start exploratory 
R&D projects in order to position themselves to take advantage of the 
knowledge "spillovers" from the public research. This possibility is nothing 
other than one of the "two faces of R&D" identified by Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989): doing R&D to create a capacity to absorb R&D results being generated 
elsewhere, should extend to absorbing public R&D results. 
 
 
    
2. Dynamic Effects 
 
The main points to be noticed under this heading concern the consequences of the 
lagged responses of input supply and knowledge spillovers from previous results of R&D 
performance with public funds. It is perhaps worth pointing out, as a preliminary remark, 
that dynamic complementarities may exist that differ in nature from the static effects of 
anticipations which were noticed above under (1: points d and e). Consider a stationary 
dynamic process, such as the steady-state equilibrium path envisaged in a growth model in 
which exogenous public and endogenous private R&D are rising pari passus. Even though 
complementarity effects of knowledge spillovers were not being anticipated but were being 
realized with a lag that induced the growth of R&D investment by firms, the growth in the 
two sectors would appear to be contemporaneous, and so indistinguishable from the 
“static” effects. This carries some immediate implications for econometric efforts to 
identify the impact of government R&D expenditures on private sector investment. One 
needs "shocks" in the form of a policy change, on one side or the other, to identify the 
underlying structure; and also a theory about the stability and speed of convergence to 
equilibrium. 
 
(a)  Given the long training periods for scientific and engineering personnel, it is more 
plausible to consider the impact of demand shifts upon wage rate (and or training 
incentives) as having a proper “dynamic” effect on the available supply of R&D 
workers.
11 In the absence of knowledge spillover effects, and with supply response 
                                                            
10 Examples of this would include "alternative energy technologies," such as solar, and methanol fuel, both 
being areas of private R&D that were stimulated in the 1970's by public research (U.S. Department of 
Energy) in the field. Similarly, a major program of research to develop fluidized coal bed techniques for 
electricity power plants, was undertaken in the U.S. at the time by the Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI), an industry-supported non-profit organization.  
 
11 Under unusual conditions, such as mobilization for war-time emergencies, it is possible to shift scientists 







taking a stock adjustment form, the implication is that the greater elasticity of the 
long-run labor supply will simply moderate the impact on the wage rate, but it 
does not vitiate it completely. There would be a reduction in the quantity of labor 
engaged in company financed (private) R&D performance. Whether this translates 
into a rise or a fall in the private sector’s level of real R&D expenditures will 
depend upon the magnitudes of the demand elasticities involved. (Formal 
modeling can address this question.) 
(b) Adjustment processes that are far from smooth have characterized the market for 
scientists and engineers. Responses to demand shocks from government R&D, 
especially that driven by scaling up and scaling down of defense and non-defense 
mission agency programs (NASA Apollo program, Department of Energy 
Synfuels program, “Star Wars”, etc.) have led to overshooting and volatility in the 
salaries of scientists and engineers in the relevant areas. Therefore, it should be 
recognized that either public or private R&D budget increases today, and the 
expectation of further expansions to come, can lead to pecuniary effects which 
may end up expanding the supply of research workers. That would reduce the real 
supply price to the other sector, once the demand in the initiating sector had 
returned to its long-term trend level. Even if the wage rate is not reduced below its 
initial level, the additional trained workers will add to private sector R&D 
performance for some long while; having been “sunk,” their human capital 
investments do not disappear even though their income expectations are 
disappointed. 
  
  The econometric complication this introduces is that the lagged positive 
employment effect in the private sector is likely to coincide with the reduction of public 
sector employment, and, a fortiori, expenditures (as wage rates drop back to trend). So, in 
time series analysis, one may pick up the inverse short-run co-variation of public and 
private R&D and conclude that the substitution effects are dominant. That there is a 
ratchet-like positive association, reflected in the trend expansion of the public and private 
sectors, will be harder to identify from the aggregate data. Again, the point is that a 
structural model is essential to identify what is going on. 
  
It is possible that there are dynamic, or long run crowding out effects too:  
(c) The notion that government labs, firms and academic institutions, have specific 
research trajectories, and training effects, implies – in a nice “path dependent” way 
– that today's mix of public and private funding can shape the capacity (and 
relative costs) of tomorrow's research system. For example, more funding for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
that, the quantitatively important sources of short-run elasticity in the supply of trained research personnel 
for either sector would appear to involve international migration. Immigration policies, therefore, should be 
regarded – far more than is usually the case – as part of the institutionally determined parameters that 
influence the impact of national R&D policy. The mobility of research workers is well recognized as a 
significant consideration by current analyses of the role of the location of R&D expenditures on rates of 
innovation and the geography of industrial development. But the tradition of international trade theory 
encourages abstracting from the possibility of labor mobility, and has concentrated discussion of international 
R&D “spillover effects” exclusively upon those involving the transfer of knowledge without directly 







academic research could result in training more researchers who sought to emulate 
their professors, and hence – if average quality remained  constant – would be less 
immediately useful when employed on proprietary company R&D projects.
12  This 
is just the dynamic form of static competition for resources at the margin, except 
that the appropriate model is of the putty-clay sort: young twigs being “twisted” 
for life by the circumstances of their early environments. But, the nub of the 
problem would seem to be poor forecasts and the high fixed costs of switching 
curricula in a “timely” way, especially when this involves cutting old educational 
programs to make room for new ones. 
(d) Still more esoteric possibilities may be contemplated.
13 Reduced funding of 
academic R&D can lead to increased real levels private sector R&D performance 
(and results) in the short-run, but, if salaries and research opportunities in the 
academy fall, the consequence may be some lowering of the quality of graduates 
who take up academic careers; and poorer quality training for the next generation 
of researchers. So, in the longer-run, the diminished flow of fundamental advances 
would tend to reduce the rate of return on private applied R&D. Were that to 
contract accordingly, the end result is the shrinkage of the total volume of 
expenditures on R&D. This is a example of cross-catalytic positive feedback: 
because the total budget for R&D is not fixed, the contraction in one sphere 
eventually yields a complementary effect in the other, even if in the interim the 
dominant effect is that of substitution between them. Obviously, with these 
hypothesized spirals movements in either direction – upwards or downwards – are 
possible, but their dynamics may not be symmetrical with respect to speed. 
Our sketch-map has by now become sufficiently complicated with lines of influence that 
run in opposing directions that the most useful form of further annotation would be of the 
sort that attached relative measures of strength to the indicated forces. This is a job for 
explicit modeling. 
 
IV. THE ANALYTICAL EXPLORER’S ANNOTATED GUIDE 
 
  By undertaking some formal modeling exercises we can hope to pass beyond mere 
identification of the various different channels of influence and the signing their likely 
effects, and arrive at an evaluation of the overall, net impacts upon private sector R&D 
expenditure level. In doing so one necessarily loses a good bit of the complexities and 
nuances that characterize the original problem. But there also are some compensating 
rewards: we can obtain insights into which of the system’s parameters are especially crucial 
in determining when the overall impact would be the crowding out of private R&D by 
public R&D, and when the reverse (complementary) effect would dominate. Although the 
usefulness of having a structural model to aid in the interpretation of econometric results 
                                                            
12 In the mid and late 1980's there was considerable complaint directed at university science and engineering 
departments in the U.S., on the ground that the kind of training they were providing was not suited to the 
needs of the private sector; and worse still, than an appreciable number among the graduates were perceived 
not to be employable in an academic sector whose research and teaching needs had ceased to expand. 
13  The dynamic example presented in compressed form in the following paragraph is based upon the more 







should hardly need to be restated, this topic-area is one where the marginal payoff from 
taking that advice seriously would still seem to be quite high.   
 
1. A Simple One Period Model 
 
This model is a highly simplified starting point for the analysis of the effects of 
public subsidies to R&D on private R&D performance. Such virtue as may be claimed for 
it will have to rest entirely on its heuristic value. Our formal analysis abstracts from 1) labor 
supply effects for R&D workers, which are assumed to be quite small in the short run due 
to the length of time necessary for training; 2) spillover effects from public R&D to private 
R&D, which are assumed to operate with a lag; 3) unemployment in the R&D sector (that 
is, we assume that the marginal product of R&D labor in the private sector justifies hiring 
the last worker in equilibrium – a simplification that seems plausible in a developed 
Western economy but less plausible elsewhere).  
 
We define the following variables: 
 
  G  Public R&D budget (“exogenous”)  
  L  Total labor supply of R&D workers (exogenous in the short run)  
 L P        Number of private R&D workers (determined by the model) 
 L G        Number of public R&D workers (determined by the model) 
  w  Wage rate of R&D workers (determined by the model) 
 
The model has three equations: 
 
L = LP + LG   The labor supply identity 
  G = w LG    The government R&D budget 
  w = f(LP)       The marginal product of labor 
 
where f(•) is a continuous monotonic function such that f’<0 and f’’<0 (i.e., there is a downward 
sloping derived demand schedule for R&D labor in the private sector). 
 
 These equations express the idea that the government budget determines the number 
of public R&D workers given the wage, the remaining workers go into the private sector, 
where the downward sloping marginal product function together with the number of workers 
actually determines the wage. From these 3 equations, one can compute the short run effects 
of an increase in the budget on the wage and the number of R&D workers in each sector. 
Combining the equations, we obtain: 
 




 [fL• (L- LP) - f(LP) ] dLP = dG 
 








[fLLG - w] dLP = dG 
 
which implies that the number of private R&D workers always declines with an increase in the 
government budget (because fL<0 and w>0). Obviously, the reverse is true for public R&D 
workers, due to the adding up constraint. It is easier to interpret the second version: 
 
[-fL• (LG ) + f(LP) ] dLG = [-fLLG  + w ] dLG = dG 
 
This says there are two effects. The second term is the direct effect on the government 
demand for R&D workers at a given wage. The first term is the effect due to the fact that (with 
a fixed labor supply) increased government funding increases the wage of R&D workers and 
therefore their required marginal product in the private sector. It is the latter that brings about 
the reduced quantity of research inputs ( LP ) demanded by the private sector. 
 
One can show explicitly that the wage rate must rise. Starting from the first-order condition for 
cost minimization in the production of innovations,  
 
  w = f(L-G/w) , 
 
total differentiation yields  
 
  dw = fL•(G dw /w
2 - dG/w) = (G/w – w/ fL)
-1 dG = fLdG /( fLLG 
 - w) . 
 
This expression is easier to interpret when rearranged in elasticity form: 
 
  (G/w) (dw/dG) = fLLG /( fLLG 
 - w) = 1/(1 – (LP/LG)(1/ε))  , 
 
where ε<0 is the elasticity of the wage (marginal product) with respect to the number of 
private R&D workers. Therefore the elasticity of the wage with respect to government 
spending is bounded between zero and one. The first term in the denominator is just the direct 
effect on the wage, due to the larger budget being applied to the same number of R&D 
workers. The second term is the knock-on effect of a reduction in the number of private R&D 
workers due to the higher wage and therefore higher required marginal product. This mitigates 
the direct wage effect captured in the first term, because as the number of workers is reduced 
due to the supply constraint, it becomes easier to satisfy the marginal product condition 
necessary to clear the labor market for R&D workers. 
 
To summarize, in this simple model with fixed R&D labor supply we readily can see 
that government funding of R&D must reduce the number of private R&D workers and 
increase their average wage. In order to determine whether the combined effect is higher or 
lower private R&D expenditure, we combine these results to obtain the elasticity of private 
R&D spending (R=wLP ) with respect to the government budget G: 
 
(G/R) dR/dG = LG (dw/dG) + (wLG/LP) (dLP/dG)  
 
= wLG /(LP (fLLG -w)) + fLLG (fLLG - w) 







= - (fLLG +wLG/LP)/(w- fLLG ) = -(1+ε)/[(LP/LG) - ε] 
 
The first term in this expression is due to the reduction in the number of private R&D workers 
from an increase in government spending and the second is due to the corresponding increase 
in the wage. The sign of the elasticity will be determined by the following condition (note that 
the denominator of the above expression is positive): 
 
  Private and public R&D are complements where ( -fL ) > w/LP   and  ε < -1 . 
 
That is, in the region where the marginal product of R&D is elastic with respect to the number 
of workers, we should observed an increase in private R&D when the government budget 
increases if the supply of R&D workers is fixed.  
 
The conclusion from this simple model is that observed private R&D spending will 
increase in response to an increase in government spending if the marginal product of private 
R&D is very responsive to a change in the number of workers. But, it will decrease if the 
marginal product of R&D is not very responsive. We might therefore expect that the former 
condition would hold when the relative size of the private R&D sector large; in this case the 
wage effect on the remaining workers dominates the reduction in the number of private 
workers, and spending on private R&D increases. This carries a quite useful message for 
econometric studies of macro-level relationships, whether in international cross-section or 
panel data: the observed relationships will not be uniform in direction if private sector R&D 
are preponderant in some economies, whereas public sector R&D dominates in others.  
 
Thus, increases in government R&D expenditures unaccompanied by the expansion of 
the share of government contract R&D should be expected to result in an equilibrium increase 
in the level of company-financed R&D expenditures in settings where company-financed R&D 
is absorbing the greater portion of the nation’s research inputs.    The latter condition might be 
indicated, say, by the predominance of the business sector’s share in total employment of 
Ph.D. scientists and engineers. Among the OECD countries, the relative share of the business 
sector in civilian R&D is larger where the manufacturing sector’s share in GDP is substantial, 
as it is in the US, Japan, and the major northern European countries. By contrast, among the 
comparatively lower per capita income countries having a less developed industrial base, public 
sector R&D is preponderant in the national total of R&D.  The results of the foregoing highly 
simplified analysis suggest that it is among the latter economies that public sector R&D 
expenditures might well have substantial “crowding out” effects, contributing to keeping the 
overall R&D to GDP ratio at low levels in these lower income countries. This would be so 
even when public research expenditures did not take the form of contract procurement of 
R&D from domestic firms. 
 
The foregoing results, as has just been noticed, abstract completely from the question 
of what sort of research is being funded in the government sector, and the bearing that this 
may have upon the generation of positive spill-overs to business firms. In the following sub-
section we examine a slightly more realistic variation of the model that allows greater scope for 
such sources of complementarity effects, while maintaining the assumption that the number of 









2. Infrastructure (basic) R&D versus applied (government contract) R&D 
 
The first extension to our model considers the choice between government funding of 
basic (non-goal-oriented or infrastructure) research and government funding of applied 
research conducted in the private sector, given an overall level of government funding. This 
choice is a stylized representation of a policy question that has been important in some 
economies in recent years.
14 It implies that the government has at least two policy instruments 
at its disposal, the level of government funding G, and the fraction of that funding devoted to 
basic research, b. 
 
We assume that the government assigns a share of researchers (c>0) to work in the 
private sector as applied R&D workers (e.g., in the defense industry, or via ATP funding) and 
that the remaining share (b=1-c) is employed in producing infrastructure knowledge (e.g., via 
the National Science Foundation or NIH). By assumption, the first group of workers is a 
perfect substitute for private R&D workers in the production function, so that the marginal 
product of R&D labor is now written f[cLG+LP]. The second group of R&D workers does not 
produce directly, but, because it expands the knowledge base available to applied R&D 
workers, the public researchers’ output shifts the private sector’s marginal product curve 
outwards. Therefore the total marginal product of R&D labor now takes the following form: 
 
 K[(1-c)  LG] f[cLG+LP] = K[b LG] f[L-bLG] = K[b(L-LP)] f[(1-b)L+bLP] 
 
where K’>0 and K’’<0 (K a positive concave function).  
 
We can now ask again how the number of private workers will respond if the budget G 
is increased, and also how the choice between basic and applied R&D affects the desired level 
of private R&D spending and its marginal product. The first result is that complicating the 
model in this way does not alter the basic result that a higher government budget will increase 
the wage and reduce the demand for private R&D workers if their supply is fixed. But the 
channels through which this process takes place are somewhat more complex than before.  
 
The marginal productivity condition in the private sector now yields the following 
equation: 
 
K[b(L-LP)] f[(1-b)L+bLP] (L- LP) = G 
 
Differentiating, we have: 
 
 [(Kf′-K′f)•b(L- LP) - Kf ] dLP = - (ZbLG + w) dLP = dG 
 
where Z is defined to be equal to (K′f - Kf′). Once again, every term in this expression is 
negative (under the assumption that the government budget is positive), so that the effect of an 
increase in R&D support is to reduce the number of private R&D workers in the economy. 
                                                            
14 See, e.g., National Academy of Sciences (1995), otherwise known as “The Press Report,” as the committee 







The second term is the direct wage effect from the government’s demand for R&D workers, as 
before. But the first term now contains two effects: the reduction in demand for R&D workers 
due both to their increased wages (the Kf′ term), and to the fact that each worker is more 
productive because of the government infrastructure spending on R&D (the -K′f term).  
 
The wage effect is also similar to the one derived in the previous section. A little 
manipulation shows that the elasticity of the R&D wage with respect to government spending 
is now given by the following: 
 
(G/w) (dw/dG) = ZbLG /(ZbLG + w) = ϕ/(1 +ϕ)  , 
 
where we now define ϕ = ZbLG/w is the elasticity of the R&D marginal product with respect 
to the number of government workers, holding the total number of R&D workers constant. In 
this setting, shifting one worker from private R&D to public R&D has an unambiguously 
positive effect on the marginal product, because the private firm will move up the marginal 
product curve at the same time that it is being shifted out by government research. Therefore 
the elasticity of the wage with respect to government spending on research varies positively 
with the elasticity of the marginal product with respect to government-funded R&D workers. 
 
The combined effect on total private R&D spending is the same as before: 
 
(G/R) (dR/dG) = (ZbLG - wLG/LP)/(ZbLG + w) = [ϕ - (LG/LP)]/(1 +ϕ). 
 
Once again, private and public R&D spending are complements if ϕ is larger than the 
ratio of public to private R&D workers. In fact, it is easy to show that the elasticity of private 
R&D expenditure with respect to public is the sum of two simple expressions, one for the 
wage and one for the number of workers: 
 
(G/R) (dR/dG) = [ϕ - (LG/LP)]/(1 +ϕ) =  ϕ/(1 + ϕ) – (LP/LG)/(1 + ϕ) 
 
Clearly the first term is positive and the second negative. In addition, the magnitude of the 
response depends on the relative size of the private sector (it is large if the private sector is 
large relative to the public sector). Although the relationship to the marginal product elasticity 
is more intricate, it is still possible to show that private R&D elasticity with respect to 
government spending is increasing everywhere as ϕ increases (the marginal product of R&D 
with respect to public R&D workers becomes less elastic) – at least in the case where we hold 
the number of workers in each sector constant. That is to say, if we compare two different 
economies with the same or similar LP/LG ratios, for the one where ϕ is large, private and 
public R&D are complements; but, as ϕ decreases towards zero, they become substitutes.  
 
Thus, the effects of total government spending on private R&D in this model are the 
same as that in the previous model (although their magnitudes may be different). This is a 
simple consequence of the fact that the infrastructure effect on the marginal product of private 









A more interesting exercise is to examine the effects of a shift toward applied R&D in 
the government budget: to accomplish this we hold the budget G fixed and differentiate with 
respect to b, the share of public R&D workers engaged in basic research: 
 
-[(Kf′-K′f)•(L- LP )
2] db  + [(Kf′-K′f)•b(L- LP) - Kf ] dLP = 0 
 
This equation yields the result that increasing the basic research share unambiguously increases 
the number of private R&D workers, holding the government budget and the total number of 
R&D workers constant: 
 
 dLP/db = (L- LP) / {b + Kf/ [(L-LP) (K′f-Kf′)]} = LG /b{1 + w/ZbLG} > 0 . 
 
Or, in elasticity form,  
 
(b/LP) dLP/db =  ϕ (LG/LP)/[ 1+ ϕ]  > 0 
 
Thus the elasticity of private R&D employment with respect to the share of public 
R&D devoted to infrastructure research is proportional to the relative size of the two sectors; 
and it varies positively with the elasticity of the R&D marginal product with respect to the 
number of government workers. If infrastructure investment is very productive, or the private 
marginal product curve is steep, or the government share is large, the number of private R&D 
workers will increase sharply in response to an increase in b. What that means is this: the more 
responsive is the private marginal product of R&D to the spillovers arising from government 
grant-type R&D funding, the bigger the increase in the number of private R&D workers that we 
can expect in response to an increase in this share. If the private marginal product of R&D is 
unresponsive to such funding, then shifting government workers from applied R&D to basic 
research has no effect on the private sector.  
 
The wage effect also is positive, which is rather to be expected: 
 
  dw/db = ZLG /(1 + ZbLG /w) = ϕ(w/b)/(1+ ϕ) 
 
which implies an elasticity of  
 
  (b/w) dw/db = ϕ/(1+ ϕ)>0 , 
 
identical to the elasticity with respect to government spending. 
  
Therefore, the total effect on private R&D spending of increasing the share of public R&D 
spent on “infrastructure research” is unambiguously positive: 
 
(b/R) (dR/db) = ϕ (LG/LP)/(1 + ϕ)  + ϕ/(1 + ϕ)= 
 
     = ϕ(L/LP)/(1 + ϕ) .  
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-(LG/LP) / [1 + ϕ] 
 
Positive 
ϕ/[1 + ϕ] 
 
Positive if ϕ > LG/LP 
   [ϕ - (LG/LP)] / [1 + ϕ] 
 




[(LG/LP) ϕ] / [1 + ϕ] 
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  In regard to the impact of expanding government R&D that takes the “non-contract” 
form, our findings accord with the thrust of most of the recent economics literature that argues 
the theoretical case for government support of non-commercially oriented civilian R&D.
15 
They are in accord also with the analysis and econometric results of several studies that have 
been carried out at much lower levels of aggregation. The work of Leyden and Link (1992) on 
the impacts upon U.S. industry R&D of NIST’s programs of infrastructure technology 
research in the areas of optical fibre standards, and electromigration characterization, could be 
cited as illustrative in this connection. Another clear instance is provided by Toole’s (1997, 
1999) detailed studies, which reveal complementarities between NIH-funding of research and 
pharmaceutical company R&D investments in specific categories of drugs.  
 
These, and still other technologically specific studies,
16 somewhat paradoxically may be 
seen to conform more closely than would broader industry-level analyses to the foregoing 
model’s strong assumption with regard to the inelasticity of the relevant supply of labor. At 
least in the short and medium terms, by carrying out empirical studies that control tightly the 
scientific and engineering area, one can more closely approximate the situation in which the 
aggregate labor supply cannot undergo marked adjustments. 
 
To get at the conditions that are relevant in the intermediate levels of aggregation, and 
a fortiori, to longer-run macro-level relationships, it is necessary to further elaborate our simple 
model by allowing for some real wage elasticity in the aggregate supply of researcher workers.  
The general intuition of doing so is clear enough, for this would tend to mitigate the impact of 
increased R&D budgets, whether public or private, upon the price of research inputs. But, as 
we have seen thus far, much of the interest, and the surprises, dwell in the modeling details, to 
which we must accordingly turn.  
                                                            
15 See, e.g., David (1997, 1998) and Klette, Moen and Griliches (1998) for recent surveys. 
16 Much of the evidence of a detailed kind is not econometric, but remains instructive nonetheless. See, e.g., 
National Research Council/ Computer Sciences and Telecommunications Board (1999) on the role of 









3. Allowing for an Elastic Labor Supply 
 
  As was indicated earlier, sustained increases in either government or private 
spending on R&D that induce higher wages for scientists and engineers are likely 
eventually to lead to increases in the labor supply of these types of workers. This takes 
place through two channels: induced immigration of scientific and technical personnel, and 
an increase in domestic university-leavers who are qualified to take up R&D employments. 
Thus, in the medium or long-term we do expect to see a labor supply response to increased 
demand for R&D that will mitigate some of the positive wage and spending effects shown 
in Table 1. To analyze the magnitude and channels for these effects, we can enrich our 
model by the addition of a simple labor supply equation: 
 
L = LP + LG     The labor supply identity 
G = w LG      The government R&D budget 
  w = K[bLG] f[(1-b)LG+LP]   The marginal product of labor 
  g(w) = L      The labor supply equation 
 
Before examining the solutions of this model it will be convenient to summarize 
our expanded notation, which is presented in Table 2. The key new parameter is η, which 
is the labor supply elasticity, assumed to be positive; in the previous section, this parameter 
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Table 3 presents the results of solving this model. Note first that the denominator 
of all the elasticities is larger, so the elasticities themselves will be smaller in absolute value, 
other things equal. The new term is the product of the long-run labor supply elasticity 
(positive) and the direct marginal product elasticity holding the supply of government 
workers constant (negative). As more R&D workers enter the market, they reduce the 
responsiveness of both the wage and the demand for private R&D workers by a factor 
proportional to the marginal product of those workers.  
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Positive if ϕ(ηL+ LP) > (1-ηψ) LG 
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 [ϕ (1+η)(L/LP)] / Γ 
 
 
The most important result in this table is that the unambiguously negative elasticity 
of private R&D workers with respect to government spending now depends on a variety of 








 (G/LP) dLP/dG  ⇔ ηϕ / (1-ηψ) > LG/L  . 
 
Thus, real private R&D spending is more likely to increase in response to an increase in 
nominal government spending when the government R&D sector is small, when the labor 
supply elasticity is large, when the government workers have a large effect on private 
productivity, or when the marginal product curve is flat (small ψ). In this case, the response 
is magnified by the positive wage effect, and nominal private R&D spending also increases. 
 
In contrast, real private R&D spending will decrease in response to an increase in 
nominal government spending when the government sector is large in relative terms, when 
the labor supply elasticity is small, when government R&D does not enhance private 
productivity, or when the marginal product curve is steep. As in the inelastic labor supply 
case, the response of nominal private R&D spending to an increase in government 
spending can go either way. The condition for a positive nominal R&D response in this 
case is 
 
(G/R) dR/dG  ⇔ [ηϕ / (1-ηψ)] [1 + LP/ηL]  > LG/L 
 
  A second major result in this table is that the elasticity of private R&D spending 
with respect to the infrastructure share, whether nominal or real, is likely to be larger than 
the elasticity in Table 1. The condition for this to happen (for nominal R&D) is the 
following: 
 
(1-ηψ+ϕ)/(1+η) > -ψ 
 
As long as the marginal product curve is fairly flat, this condition is likely to hold.  
 
4. Summary of  model results 
 
  We conclude this section by summarizing the main results of our simple model. We 
analyzed the short and long run effects on real and nominal private R&D spending of two 
possible changes to government R&D policy: an increase in overall spending and an 
increase in the share devoted to basic “infrastructure” research. In general, the long run 
impacts are more benign than the short run, primarily because the long run allows the 
supply of scientists and engineers to adjust to increased demand for their services, whereas 
in the short run, the effect of increased government demand in the face of inelastic S&E 
labor supply is to drive up wages in that sector. 
 
  For our first policy experiment (an increase in the total public R&D budget), we 
find that real private R&D decreases in the short run, but will increase in the long run if the 
government R&D sector is relatively high, the labor supply of scientists and engineers is 
elastic, or the marginal product-R&D curve is relatively flat (that is, effect of R&D on 
productivity does not fall very quickly as R&D budgets increase). Nominal R&D will 
increase in the short or long run, except when the public share of total R&D is very large. 
 
  For our second policy experiment (an increase in the share of public R&D devoted 







increase in both the short and the long run, with the effect larger in the long run. This 
result is due to the fact that increasing the share of basic research holding the total public budget 
constant increases the private productivity of R&D without the attendant negative effects via 
the demand for R&D workers. 
 
 
IV. SOME QUANTITATIVE THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS 
 
In this, penultimate section it is appropriate to undertake a preliminary assessment 
of the empirical plausibility of our framework and its implications for “crowding out.” Our 
approach will be to combine the theoretical results summarized in Tables 1 and 3 with 
elasticity estimates for some key parameters, drawing upon the econometric findings of 
others for the latter. 
 
The questions of greatest immediate interest pertain to the probable magnitudes 
implied for the other, unknown parameters of the model, and the consequent signs of the 
elasticity of nominal and real private R&D spending with respect to increases in public 
R&D spending. Recall that those magnitudes are in question only for the case we describe 
as “the long-run,” because in the “short run” the labor supply is taken to be fixed and the 
real volume of R&D resources invested (the number of R&D workers) has been shown to 
necessarily decrease when government expenditures rise. It should be evident that the 
computations reported here are rather conjectural in character; they are primarily 
illustrative in purpose, but offer a “reality check” on our model.  
 
Our first avenue of exploration exploits the very interesting estimates that have 
been obtained by Austan Goolsbee (1998) for the short and medium to long-run elasticity 
of the R&D-worker wage with respect to R&D spending. Using a panel of scientists and 
engineers drawn from the U.S. Current Population Survey for the period 1968-1994, 
Goolsbee estimates that short-run wage elasticity for these workers with respect to nominal 
federal R&D spending is equal to 0.22, with a standard error of 0.03.
17 Although he does 
not report a long-run wage elasticity, he does obtain an income response to the average of 
the past four years of R&D that is 0.13 below the short-run income response. From this 
we will infer that the medium to long-run wage elasticity is approximately 0.10. 
 
Turning to Table 1, we can immediately use this information to calculate an 
estimate of ϕ, the elasticity of the private marginal product of R&D with respect to 
government workers LG, holding the total labor supply constant:  
 
ϕ = 1/((1/.22)-1) ≅ 0.28 
 
Thus, we may say that in the short-run, at least for countries similar to the United States, 
the measured nominal private R&D response to an increase in public spending will be 
                                                            
17 Although it is unclear from the published paper, the numbers reported in Table 1 of the paper are 
actually elasticities rather than regression coefficients for the level variables as the table seems to indicate 
(Goolsbee, private communication, 1998). We are interpreting this as the elasticity with respect to 
nominal spending because the R&D figures he uses are not adjusted using an actual R&D deflator, 







positive if the government share is less than about 0.22.
18  If the short-run wage effect were 
similar in other developed countries, we would expect that countries with larger 
government shares would display crowding out behavior. This is consistent with the results 
in Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (1999), who find that countries with high subsidization 
rates have negative public R&D coefficients in the private R&D investment equation. 
However, the latter results are based on error-corrected regressions, which deliver long-run 
rather than short-run behavior. It is also not clear from Guellec and van Pottelsberghe’s 
paper whether the subsidization measure upon which their analysis focuses really 
corresponds closely to the measure of public support adopted here – which encompasses 
all government R&D spending. Reassuring as the reported results are, they have to be 
taken with a grain of salt. 
 
In the case of the United States, the government-financed share of R&D spending 
fell from about 60 percent to 36 percent over the course of the period examined by 
Goolsbee (1998). That would imply both that the short-run impact of any increase in public 
funding – without a shift in the mix favoring grant support – should have been to crowd 
out private R&D, but that this impact should have weakened appreciably between the late 
1960’s and the mid-1990’s. This result is moderately consistent with the trends of reported 
magnitudes surveyed in David, Hall and Toole (1999), although many of the results 
pertaining to the U.S. imply complementarity rather than crowding out. 
 
Turning to the long-run response of private R&D, Goolsbee’s estimate of 0.10 for 
the wage elasticity has the following implication: 
 
0.10 = ϕ/Γ =  ϕ/(1-ηψ+ϕ) = 0.28/(1.28-ηψ) Ù  ηψ = -1.52 
 
We can use this result to bound the long-run elasticity of real and nominal R&D with 
respect to an increase in government R&D spending. For real spending, the elasticity is  
 
  ∂logLP/∂logG = [-(LG/LP)(1-ηψ) + ηϕ(L/ LP)]/ Γ  
≅ [-2.52 (LG/LP) + 0.28 η (1+ LG/LP)]/2.8 > 0  
Ù η>9 (LG /L) 
 
This has two implications: first, the long-run labor supply elasticity of R&D workers needs 
to be quite large for the real effect to be positive, unless the government share is very 
small. Second, as the government share of spending rises, it becomes more likely that 
crowding out would be observed even in the long run.  
 
  The elasticity of nominal R&D expenditures, however, is slightly larger than the 
magnitude just considered (because it includes the positive wage effect, equal to 0.10). The 
condition for this elasticity to be positive is therefore given by: 
 
  [-(LG/LP)(1-ηψ) + ϕ(1+ηL/ LP)]/ Γ > 0  
Ù [-0.9 (LG/LP) + 0.10 (1+η (1+LG/ LP))] > 0 
                                                            
18 The short-run elasticity of private R&D with respect to public R&D is positive if ϕ>LG/LP, or if 







Ù η>9 (LG /L) - 1 
 
which is slightly easier to satisfy.  For a country such a Japan, in which the government 
share of R&D funding was below one-fifth at the beginning of the 1990’s, the critical value 
of the long-run labor supply elasticity would be something like η > 0.8. It is not 
implausible, then, that there would have been little crowding out effects from the major 
program of expanded public funding for science that was called for by the Council for 
Science and Technology in Japan in 1996 and approved by the government of the day. In 
view of the thrust of that program towards changing the mix of national R&D 
expenditures strongly in favor of university-based, “grant” research, it would seem that the 
plan was particularly well-calculated to yield a long-term positive stimulus to private sector 
R&D.
19 But, as this particular example underscores, to have arrived at the right science and 
technology policy is not the same thing as having the public sector resources with which to 
implement it. As a result, one of the less serious consequences of the difficulties that have 
beset the Japanese economy in recent years has been to deprive us of an interesting natural 
experiment with which to test the empirical implications of our model. 




  We begin with a cautionary reminder: the model presented here, although it 
captures the key public R&D impacts, is highly stylized and results may differ if a more 
complex setting is analyzed. The primary problem is the heterogeneity of R&D, both 
public and private, which makes it difficult to talk about moving down a single marginal 
product curve. For example, we distinguished only two kinds of public R&D spending, 
basic and other, one of which enhances private productivity while the other does not. In 
reality, the situation is most countries is much more complex, ranging from defense R&D 
through various applied R&D programs for energy and the environment through budgets 
for basic science and higher education.  
 
We also assumed that R&D spending consisted only of the wages of scientific 
personnel, whereas in fact, although this is the major portion of R&D budgets, they also 
include spending on equipment and supplies. This is unlikely to have a major impact on 
our results, because the “production function” for R&D tends to include a fixed amount of 
such spending per R&D employee; it will however moderate any precise magnitudes that 
we have computed. Finally, we assumed constant elasticity production functions and 
supply functions throughout. Where our results are unambiguously signed, they would not 
change under different functional forms (as long as the signs of the elasticities remain 
unchanged). However, some of our conditional statements and magnitudes might be 
modified if constant elasticities did not hold. 
 
Turning to our main substantive conclusions, many OECD economies have 
increased or are contemplating increasing the public support of R&D over the past decade 
or so. What we have shown in this paper is that an important ingredient in the assessment 
of the effects of these increases is the issue of the flexibility of scientific labor supply in 
                                                            







response to increases in its wage. Although this topic is an old one, it usually goes under 
the heading of “manpower planning” and is often treated as a branch of the labor 
economics literature that is separate from the R&D and technology policy literature (see, 
for example, Arrow and Capron 1959, Lerner 1992, or Stephan 1996). Our first proud 
conclusion from the analysis above is that the time has come to integrate the understanding 
and results from this literature into the study of R&D investment decisions. That is, at least 
when doing policy analysis at the economy-wide level, it is not appropriate to treat the 
private R&D-doing sector as price and wage-taking and to focus attention only on the 
dollar amount of R&D spending. In this, we are to a certain extent echoing and reinforcing 
a point made by Goolsbee (1998).  
 
Where we have the appropriate numbers available, the implications of our simple 
model are not inconsistent with observed behavior. Our second general conclusion, 
therefore, is that is this type of analysis would appear to be worth pursuing in future 
international comparative research, using more precise data on the cross-country variations 
in the relative size of the public and private sectors, subsidy rates, wage rates for R&D 
workers, and R&D cost variables. Some greater attention to structural specification has 
been seen to be quite feasible as a complement to econometric estimation. Indeed, it offers 
a way to make greater sense of the variety of empirically observed responses of private 
R&D to public R&D expenditures, and represents our best hope of being able ultimately 
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